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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The trial court correctly dismissed Appellants' complaint because it 
did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Standard of review: A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. See S.S. v. State. 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter. 970 
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
2. Appellants may not raise constitutional issues for the first time on 
appeal. 
3. The trial court correctly followed the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b), and did not deny Appellants' their due process rights or their right 
of access to the courts. 
Standard of review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and 
ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County. 1999 UT 36,1fl7, 977 P.2d 1201; Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, f6, 
977 P.2d 479. 
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4. Appellants' constitutional challenges to the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act based upon the actions of the Utah Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing are not relevant on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from an Order of Dismissal issued by the trial court on 
February 4, 2002. The defendants in the underlying action, McKay-Dee Hospital Center; 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc.; Ivan D. Wright, M.D.; Harold Vonk, M.D.; and Ronald 
S. Rankin, M.D. (now Appellees), all moved to dismiss Plaintiffs'/Appellants' claims for 
failure to comply with the compulsory conditions precedent of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act—specifically, those provisions requiring medical malpractice claimants 
to file a Request for Prelitigation Review with the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing and to serve that Request by mail to the named defendant health 
care providers. 
The trial court, considering the motions to dismiss as motions for summary 
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ruled in favor of 
Defendants/Appellees. Although the trial court found that a disputed fact existed 
concerning whether Plaintiffs/Appellants had filed the Request with the Division, the 
court found undisputed the fact that Plaintiffs/Appellants failed to mail the Request on all 
named health-care providers in the action. The court therefore concluded that it had no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter because Plaintiffs/Appellants had failed to comply with all 
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of the Act's directives. In the words of the trial court, "Because plaintiffs did not satisfy 
the conditions precedent to commencing litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs 
could not commence their action. Further, because the plaintiffs' action could not be and 
was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint." Plaintiffs/Appellants then brought this appeal based on the trial court's order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On June 12, 2001, Appellants filed a Complaint in the Third District 
Judicial Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, alleging, among other things, a medical 
malpractice claim against Appellees. See Complaint, LaBelle v. McKay-Dee Hosp. Ctr.. 
etaL Civil No. 010905108, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R.1-9.) 
2. Appellants' allegations concern the medical treatment and care of 
Norma Mary Harriman in February 1999. Id at ffl[13-15. 
3. Appellees Ivan D. Wright, M.D., Harold Vonk, M.D., and Ronald S. 
Rankin, M.D., are health care providers as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11). See 
R.118. 
4. In February 2001, Dr. Wright received a copy of Plaintiffs5 "notice 
of intent by certified mail. See Affidavit of Robert G. Wright (R. 125-127). 
5. Immediately thereafter, counsel for Dr. Wright filed a Notice of 
Appearance of Counsel with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("the Division") on February 28, 2001, and served the Notice on Plaintiffs' counsel, as 
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well as counsel for all other parties named in the Notice of Intent. See Notice of 
Appearance (R. 128-130). 
6. On July 10, 2001, Defendant McKay-Dee Hospital and 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that 
Appellants had failed to comply with the compulsory conditions precedent to 
commencing litigation imposed by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. § 78-
14-12(1). See (R. 13-21.) 
7. By July 10, 2001, counsel for Dr. Wright had not received any 
indication from the Division that Appellants had filed a Request for Prelitigation Panel or 
that the Division had accepted such a Request. See (R. 126, f 6.) 
8. Counsel for Dr. Wright checked several times with the Division to 
determine if a Request had been filed and if prelitigation proceedings had been set. See 
(IcL 15.) 
9. Neither Dr. Wright nor his counsel has ever received service of any 
Request for Prelitigation Panel. See (R.127,17.) 
10. Dr. Wright moved to dismiss the Complaint on September 19, 2001. 
See (R. 112-144.) 
11. Dr. Vonk and Dr. Rankin moved to dismiss the Complaint on 
October 11, 2001. See (R. 188-195.) 
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12. According to the testimony before the trial court, Appellants did not 
request prelitigation panel review with the Division within sixty days of serving the notice 
of intent as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(a). Appellants also did not submit 
the requisite filing fee to the Division. See Affidavit of Adele Bancroft (R. 130-132.).1 
13. The Division therefore did not convene a prelitigation panel to 
review the merits of Appellants' claims against the named health care providers in this 
matter. See (R. 132, p.) 
14. Defendants/Appellees submitted their motions to dismiss to the trial 
court, and the court heard oral argument on the motions on December 19, 2001. See 
(R.258.) 
15. The trial court issued its ruling by minute entry, dismissing 
Plaintiffs'/Appellants' case for lack of jurisdiction. See (R.239-240.) 
16. Specifically, the trial court considered Defendants'/Appellees' 
motions as Rule 56 motions and found that a disputed fact existed as to whether 
Plaintiffs/Appellants had filed a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review with the Division. 
See (Id.) 
1
 The record on appeal does not include a record page number for the first page of 
Ms. Bancroft's affidavit, which is attached as an exhibit to Dr. Wright's Memorandum in 
support of his Motion to Dismiss. Appellees refer the court to R. 130 as the last record cite 
just prior to the first page of Ms. Bancroft's affidavit. Defendants McKay-Dee Hospital 
Center and Intermountain Health Care, Inc., originally filed Ms. Bancroft's affidavit in 
support of their Reply to Plaintiffs' "Opposition to Motion to Dismiss." 
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17. Nevertheless, the trial court also found that Plaintiffs/Appellants 
acknowledged that they did not mail a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review to all the 
health care providers named in the action. See (Id.) 
18. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to 
hear the merits of the case based upon Plaintiffs'/Appellants' failure to comply with the 
conditions precedent mandated by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, (or "the Act") 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-12(l)(c), 78-14-12(2)(b). See (Id) 
19. Defendants'/Appellees' counsel prepared an Order of Dismissal 
consistent with the trial court's ruling and submitted it to the court for review. The Order 
of Dismissal included the following finding of fact and conclusions of law: 
[T]he Court finds that it is undisputed that neither the 
plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request tor 
prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health care 
providers named in the notice and request." In light of the 
plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of 
the health care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed 
to comply with the statutory requirements which "are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." 
The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no 
jurisdiction based on the legislative mandates set forth in the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 
et seq. 
Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to 
commencing litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs 
could not commence their action. Further, because the 
plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this 
6 
Court lacks jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
See (R.246, fl3, 4, 5.) 
20. The court entered the Order of Dismissal on February 4, 2002. See 
(R.245-248.) 
21. Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's Order 
of Dismissal on March 4, 2002. See (R.249-251.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint because it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the merits of their claims. Appellants failed to comply with the 
compulsory conditions precedent of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act prior to 
commencing litigation. Specifically, Appellants did not mail a copy of their Request for 
Prelitigation Panel Review to all the named health-care providers in the action. The trial 
court also did not have "concurrent jurisdiction" with the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing because the plain language of the Act expressly conditions the 
filing of an action in court upon a claimant's compliance with certain prerequisites. 
Appellants failed to comply with the Act and, therefore, were precluded from 
commencing litigation. 
Appellants may not raise constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. 
Several constitutional issues brought in this appeal were either not raised before the trial 
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court or were so inadequately briefed and argued that the trial court had no meaningful 
opportunity to rule upon them. This Court should therefore disregard those arguments. 
Even if this Court chooses to consider Appellants' constitutional challenges 
to the trial court's application of the Act, those challenges should be rejected. The trial 
court's application of the Act was in accordance with the Utah and United States 
Constitutions, and Appellants were not denied any due process rights or their right of 
access to the courts. 
Finally, this Court should refuse to consider Appellants' constitutional 
challenges to the Act based upon the Division's actions because they are not relevant to 
this appeal. The trial court's Order of Dismissal was based upon the undisputed fact that 
Appellants failed to mail a copy of their Request for Prelitigation Panel Review to all 
named health-care providers in the action. The Division's conduct, either in accepting 
Appellants' alleged filing of their Request or in promulgating administrative procedures 
for such filing, was not the basis for the trial court's dismissal. The Court should therefore 





THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MATTER. 
Appellants first argue that the trial court erroneously concluded that it did 
not have jurisdiction to hear their claims because Appellants failed to comply with the 
compulsory conditions precedent to commencing litigation set forth in the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq. ("the Act"). Appellants 
correctly state the prerequisites for filing an action against a health care provider in Utah, 
but conveniently omit or misconstrue the effect of failing to comply with the provisions 
of the Act. 
Appellants contend that they fulfilled the initial prelitigation requirement of 
filing and serving a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-8. Dr. Wright does not dispute that fact. Nevertheless, Appellants were then also 
required to file and serve by mail a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review within 60 days 
after serving their Notice pursuant to section 78-14-12(2), which states: 
(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the Division within 60 days after the 
service of the statutory notice. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent. The request 
shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and 
request. 
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(Emphasis added.) See also Malone v. Parker. 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992) (recognizing 
claimant must not only file request with Division but must also serve copy of request 
upon all named health-care providers). 
Indeed, Appellants' counsel conceded during oral argument before the trial 
court that he never mailed a copy of the Request to any of the named health care 
providers, as required by the statute. 
THE COURT: Now, when did you mail the request for pre-litigation 
panel? 
MR. ROUNDY: We didn't mail that, a copy of that, to them. 
THE COURT: 
MR. ROUNDY: 
And doesn't the statute require that? 
There is a reference in there to it being required. As 
I've thought back about why we might not have mailed 
that to them individually, at that time I think it was 
simply because, as in a case where I might have 
numerous defendants, and I serve one of them before I 
serve the other ones, I don't send copies of everything 






In this case — 
Well, but see, the rules of procedure really don't apply, 
do they? There are some standards that the legislature, 
right or wrong, has decided to give special treatment to 
health-care providers.... But in any event, you 
apparently agree that, for whatever reason, you did not 
mail a copy of the request for pre-litigation panel to the 
health-care providers. 
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MR. ROUNDY: That's correct. 
Motion Hearing, December 19, 2001 (R.258, at 18-20). 
Based upon this concession and the absence of any controverted fact in 
Appellants' memoranda, the trial court specifically found that no dispute existed that 
Appellants failed to comply with the plain language of Section 78-14-12(2)(b), which 
requires a claimant to serve a copy of the Request for Prelitigation Panel Review upon all 
named health-care providers in the action. As the Court stated in its Order of Dismissal: 
[T]he Court finds that it is undisputed that neither the 
plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for 
prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health care 
providers named in the notice and request." In light of the 
plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of 
the health care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed 
to comply with the statutory requirements which "are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." 
Order of Dismissal, at 2, ^3 (R.246) (emphasis added). 
Appellants conveniently ignore the trial court's ruling on this point and 
instead argue that because the Division did not convene a prelitigation panel review 
hearing, they were thereby released from all prelitigation requirements pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii). Appellants' argument may hold true for a claimant who 
has timely filed and served an accepted Request for Prelitigation Panel Review and then 
received no response from the Division. Indeed, the Division, once it accepts a Request, 
has jurisdiction to hear the matter for only 180 days. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
11 
12(3)(b)(i). If no hearing is held within 180 days after the Request has been accepted, 
"the division has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant 
is considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under this section 
prior to the commencement of litigation." Id § 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii). 
In this case, however, the trial court found as an undisputed fact that 
Appellants did not timely serve a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review to all named 
health-care providers and, therefore, did not comply with the compulsory conditions 
precedent of the Act. See Order of Dismissal, at 1fl[5-6 (R.246). As such, the trial court 
had no jurisdiction over the matter and properly dismissed Appellants' Complaint. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c); see also Carter v. Milford Vallev Mem'l Hosp., 2000 
UT App 21,1fl3, 996 P.2d 1076 ("If these requirements are not fully met, the action will 
be dismissed.") (citing Malone. 826 P.2d at 134). 
Appellants argue that this ruling was in error and that their Complaint was 
properly filed because the trial court has "concurrent jurisdiction" with the Division. 
Appellants, however, ignore the plain language of the Act, which declares that 
prelitigation panel review proceedings are a "compulsory condition precedent to 
commencing litigation." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c). Their argument also 
declines to recognize that once a proper Request for Prelitigation Panel Review is filed 
with the Division, the statute of limitations is tolled until the earlier of 60 days following 
either of two events: (1) the Division issues an opinion by prelitigation panel, or (2) the 
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Division's jurisdiction is terminated upon failing to complete a prelitigation review panel 
hearing within 180 days after the Request for Prelitigation Panel Review is filed. See id. 
§ 78-14-12(3)(a) & (b). The plain language of these subdivisions is jurisdictional and bars 
a trial court from hearing the merits of the matter until the Division has issued its opinion 
or conceded its own jurisdiction. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion under similar statutes. See 
Johnson v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, Ind., 547 F. Supp. 780, 781 (N.D. Ind. 1982) 
(affirming trial court's decision to dismiss medical malpractice complaint which was filed 
before claimant submitted claims to Commissioner of Insurance as required prerequisite 
to suit under Indiana statute); Schwartz v. Lilly, 452 A.2d 1302, 1304-05 (Md. Ct. App. 
1982) (trial court was in error to deny defendant's motion raising preliminary objection 
on ground of jurisdiction where plaintiffs had not first filed claims with Health Claims 
Arbitration Office under statute requiring all malpractice claims to be submitted first to 
nonbinding arbitration); Perez v. Brubaker, 660 P.2d 619, 621 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding district court had no jurisdiction to hear claims where claimant did not first 
submit claims to state Medical Review Commission and obtain a decision from that 
commission).2 
2
 Other state and federal courts considering delegation of judicial powers and 
separation of powers attacks against their own medical review panel statutes have 
concluded that the proceedings are jurisdictional and are not an improper delegation of 
judicial power. See, e.g., Keves v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 356 (Alaska 
1988). "Most have relied on the maxim that 'the essence of judicial power is the final 
13 
Indeed, the above statutory scheme recognizes the exclusive nature of the 
prelitigation proceedings, allowing a suspension of the statute of limitations so that the 
Division may conduct a review of the matter before the litigant heads to court. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a). Once the Division has either completed its review or fails to 
complete its review upon proper request, the statute of limitations resumes and the litigant 
may commence litigation. See id. A petitioner who complies with the Act and who timely 
files and serves the Request for Prelitigation Panel Review will thus not be precluded 
from filing a complaint in district court once the panel issues its opinion and a Certificate 
of Compliance. See id.: Utah Admin. Code R156-78A-14. 
In this case, however, Appellants did not file and serve upon all parties a 
Request for Prelitigation Panel Review within 60 days after filing their Notice of Intent. 
The two-year statute of limitations—extended by 120 days—was therefore not tolled and 
authority to render and enforce a judgment,' and thus found no separation of powers 
problems because the actions of the panel are at most advisory and its decision has no 
more weight than an expert opinion." Id (citing DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack 
Mem'l Hosp.. 628 F.2d 287, 292 (4th Or. (Va.), 1980); Eastin v. Broomfield 570 P.2d 
744, 750 (Ariz. 1977); Lacvv. Green. 428 A.2d 1171, 1178 (Del. Super. 1981); 
Prendergast v. Nelson. 256 N.W.2d 657, 666-67 (Neb. 1977)). This reasoning applies 
with equal force to Utah's statute because the prelitigation panel review is "informal and 
nonbinding." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c). In fact, Utah's statute is arguably less 
invasive into the role of the judiciary than those of other states. For example, the statute 
upheld in Keyes went so far as to uphold as constitutional the statute's provision allowing 
the panel's published opinion to be introduced as "expert" evidence at trial. See Keves. 
750 P.2d at 346-47. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, however, forbids the 
disclosure of the review panel's decision and protects the confidentiality of the 
proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(d) ("Proceedings conduct under 
authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process."). 
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expired on June 14, 2001. Although Appellants filed their Complaint within the 120-day 
extension on June 12, 2001, the filing was defective because the Complaint contained no 
certification that Appellants had fully complied with the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, that a prelitigation panel review hearing had been held, or that the Division's 
jurisdiction had expired. The trial court therefore had no jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-12. 
Appellants' reliance on the this Court's decision in Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 
20 (Utah 1990), to justify their premature filing in the Third District court is simply 
misplaced. Although the Avila Court determined that the complaint which was filed 
before a prelitigation panel review was held should not be dismissed in that instance, the 
facts and holding in that case are inapposite. In Avila. the plaintiff filed a Notice of Intent 
within 90 days of the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. See id. at 20-21. 
The statute of limitations was therefore extended by 120 days pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-14-
8. See id. at 21. The plaintiff then filed a request for prelitigation panel review within the 
60-day time period required by statute. See id. The Division also held a prelitigation panel 
hearing, but the plaintiffs attorney did not present evidence or argument on his client's 
behalf. See id. at 22. The Division thereafter did not issue an opinion. See id. 
Eleven months later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis 
that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the two-year statute of limitation. The trial 
court recognized that, despite the compulsory conditions precedent of the Act, the 
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plaintiff had filed the complaint before the prelitigation panel review hearing was held. 
See id. at 21. The trial court also noted that the prelitigation panel review was incomplete 
and, on that basis, refused to dismiss the complaint and tolled the proceedings until after a 
complete panel review could be accomplished. See id. 
After a second prelitigation panel hearing, the review panel issued an 
opinion, but the plaintiff did not re-file his complaint in district court. The defendants 
again filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to file a complaint 
within 60 days after the prelitigation panel issued its opinion. See id. (citing U.C.A. § 78-
14-12(3)). The trial court thereafter dismissed the plaintiff's action. 
In reversing the trial court's dismissal, this Court found that the defendants 
had not sought and obtained a final ruling on their initial motion to dismiss and thus the 
defendants were estopped from arguing that the plaintiff's complaint was filed untimely. 
Based upon the defendants' failure to act and the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the 
fact that he had already filed a complaint, the Supreme Court concluded that, in equity, 
the plaintiff's complaint should not have been dismissed. See id. at 23. More important, 
this Court added that, "[i]n so holding, we do not condone the act of filing a complaint 
before the time specified in the Malpractice Act. The instant case is an exception 
necessitated by procedural errors and omissions." Id (emphasis added). 
Thus, Avila does not stand for the proposition Appellants advance, and this 
Court should not rely on Avila to condone the filing of a complaint in these 
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circumstances. As this Court made clear, Avila was an equitable exception necessitated 
by unique facts—facts that are not present in this case. Unlike the petitioner in Avila, 
Appellants in this case did not file and serve a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review 
within the 60 days provided by the Act, and no prelitigation panel review hearing was 
ever held. Because Plaintiffs did not comply with the conditions precedent mandated by 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act prior to commencing litigation, the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to hear the matter. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's 
decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS MAY NOT RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Appellants launch a volley of constitutional challenges to the trial court's 
ruling and the Division's conduct, contending that the trial court and the Division violated 
their rights under the open courts clause, the equal protection clause, and the due process 
clause of the Utah Constitution. Appellants also argue that the trial court and the Division 
violated Article XVI, section 5, of the Utah Constitution, which provides certain 
guarantees for wrongful death actions. Violations of federal rights are also referenced. 
"It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that matters not raised at 
the trial level cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State ex rel. M.S.. 781 P.2d 
1289, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. John. 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989)). 
This general rule "applies equally to constitutional challenges not presented below, but 
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raised subsequently on appeal." Id (citations omitted); c£ Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
7,1f5, 43 P.2d 467 ("Any issues that were not addressed on direct appeal but could have 
been raised may not be raised for the first time in a post-conviction relief proceeding 
absent unusual circumstances. This rule applies to all claims, including constitutional 
questions.") (citing Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998)). 
In this case, Appellants purport to challenge the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act on several constitutional grounds. Many of those grounds, however, are 
raised for the first time on appeal. In fact, Appellants utterly fail to identify in their 
opening brief where in the record they specifically preserved their constitutional 
arguments before the trial court. This omission directly contravenes Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires an appellant to include in the brief "[a] 
statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and . . . citation to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court; o r . . . a statement of grounds for seeking review of 
an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5) (emphasis added). 
Should the Court choose to forgive Appellants' failure to comply with Rule 
24, it should still not consider the merits of Appellants' constitutional arguments other 
than those regarding due process or right of access to the courts because they are raised in 
this Court for the first time. Appellees acknowledge that Appellants did address some 
constitutional challenges in their opposition to the motions before the trial court. Other 
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constitutional challenges made below, however, are not those raised in this appeal. For 
example, Appellants did not raise the issue of whether the Act violated equal protection in 
any of their opposition memoranda to Appellees' motions to dismiss. See R.22-25; 78-86; 
154-166; 196-199; 200-207; 208-210. They should not be heard now on that issue when 
the trial court was never given any meaningfiil opportunity to consider the issue and rule 
upon it. 
Appellants' counsel briefly addressed other constitutional arguments based 
upon due process and access to the courts during the hearing on Appellees' motions for 
summary judgment. Those arguments, however, were cursory at best, and the trial court 
was not provided with any meaningful analysis or case law supporting Appellants' 
position on those issues, either in Appellants' memoranda or at oral argument. See 
Motion Hearing, December 19, 2001 (R.258, at 27, 29). Appellants also have not shown 
that the trial court committed plain error or that any exceptional circumstances warrant 
consideration of their arguments. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Simply put, Appellants failed to adequately 
preserve their constitutional arguments which they now raise on appeal, and the Court 
should refuse to consider them. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-
12(2)(b) WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Even if this Court concludes that Appellants adequately preserved their 
constitutional challenges to the trial court's interpretation of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, no grounds support those arguments. The trial court correctly concluded 
that, based on undisputed facts, Appellants failed to comply with the compulsory 
conditions precedent to commencing litigation when they did not serve a copy of the 
Request for Prelitigation Panel Review upon all named health-care providers in the 
action. This violated the plain mandate of Section 78-14-12(2), as explained above. See 
Point I, infra. 
Insofar as Appellants' constitutional challenges address this particular 
ruling,3 and assuming that Appellants adequately preserved those challenges, this Court 
may easily conclude that the Act's requirement to serve all named health-care providers 
with the Request for Prelitigation Panel Review does not violate Appellants' procedural 
3
 In support of their argument that the trial court erroneously interpreted the Act, 
Appellants cite several of the trial court's statements made during oral argument. These 
statements, however, were not part of the trial court's ruling from the bench, see R.258, at 
38-44, and even if they were, this Court has held that oral statements made from the 
bench are not the judgment of the case and therefore are not appealable. See State v. 
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). This Court should therefore reject any implication 
that those statements comprise a part of the trial court's judgment in this case. 
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or substantive due process rights, deny them access to the courts, or deny them equal 
protection under the law.4 
1. The Act does not violate Appellants1 due process rights. 
Appellants do not explain how the prelitigation review proceedings violate 
"due process," either under the Utah Constitution or the United States Constitution. If 
Appellants' argument is that the proceedings violate their substantive due process rights, 
"it is well-established that legislative acts adjusting economic burdens and benefits carry 
a presumption of constitutionality and that the person challenging the enactment must 
4
 Appellants off-handedly contend, without any analysis or citation to case law, 
that the prelitigation panel review proceedings violate their right to equal protection under 
the law. Appellants, however, have failed to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which, in part, requires Appellants' brief to include an argument 
section containing "the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9). Appellants offer nothing other than two references to "equal protection" in 
their brief. No mention is made of what classification or fundamental right is involved, 
and the brief is also bereft of any analysis regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny to be 
applied. 
Moreover, Appellants' arguments fail to adequately cite to the "parts of the record 
relied on." For example, Point II of Appellants' argument includes a grand total of two 
references to the oral argument transcript (without record cites), and Point III is equally 
devoid of references. This Court has repeatedly declared that it "is not ca depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. 
Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, J6, 1 P.3d 1108 (citing State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, p 1, 973 P.2d 
404 (citations omitted); Mackav v. Hardv. 973 P.2d 941, 948 n.9 (Utah 1998)). Like the 
appellant in Gamblin. Appellants' brief in argument as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Gamblia 2000 UT 44 at fl6. Indeed, "[b]riefs that do 
not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
court.'" IdL (citations omitted). As such, this Court should refuse to consider Appellants' 
inadequately briefed arguments. 
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establish that the legislature has acted in an 'arbitrary and irrational5 manner." Houk v. 
Furman. 613 F. Supp. 1022, 1033-34 (D. Me. 1985) (citing Userv v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S. Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976); Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464, 99 L.Ed. 563 
(1955)). Moreover, this Court has reiterated that "[w]hen construing the language of a 
statutory provision, '[w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly " 
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil. Gas and Mining. 2001 UT 112,1f30, 38 P.3d 
291 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). This court 
"will not 'infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the 
interpretation must be based on the language used, and [this Court] has no power to 
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'" Id (quoting Berrett v. 
Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)). 
Appellants have not offered any argument or analysis to demonstrate 
exactly how the Act is an "arbitrary and irrational" exercise of the legislature's authority, 
as is their burden to do so. See Houk. 613 F. Supp. at 1033-34. Without such explanation, 
this Court should reject Appellants' due process challenge. Even so, Appellees assert that 
the Act is anything but arbitrary and irrational. It is a carefully crafted measure to ensure 
the continued availability of health care in the face of mounting health care and 
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malpractice insurance costs. See Utah Code. Ann. § 78-14-2.5 Other courts have reached 
the same conclusion regarding their own legislation. See Linder v. C.W. Smith. 629 P.2d 
1187, 1190 (Mt. 1981) ("In all instances, the articulated basis for the panel acts has been 
the malpractice crisis existing in many states, with this legislation intended as a means to 
limit malpractice filings to those which are clearly meritorious.5'). Even today, the rising 
costs of medical malpractice insurance threaten to seriously curb the availability of 
medical services to the public and support the continued viability of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. See, e.g.. Michael Freedman, The Tort Mess. Forbes, May 13, 2002, at 
91-98; Laura Bradford, Out of Medicine. Time (Inside Business Section), September 
2002.6 
5
 The Utah legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq. in response to a 
growing medical malpractice insurance crisis during the early and mid-1970s. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Several other states enacted similar legislation to alleviate the 
effects of the crisis. See Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska. Inc.. 750 P.2d 343, 353 n.14 
(Alaska 1988) (citing Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Crisis: Constitutional Implications. 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759, 793 (1977); Comment, An 
Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis. 1975 Duke L. 
J. 1417; Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis. 36 Md. L. Rev. 
489, 513-14 (1977); Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation — A First 
Checkup. 50 Tulane L. Rev. 655, 679-80 (1976)). 
6
 Recent figures reflecting a 43% increase in medical malpractice jury verdicts 
nationwide are accompanied by a sharp incline in malpractice premiums. The renewed 
crisis hits close to home. According to Bradford, Nevada "is one of the states with the 
sharpest rise in malpractice costs," which has forced some major insurance carriers to 
withdraw malpractice coverage for physicians in that state and has forced physicians to 
limit the number of patients they treat or leave their practices altogether. Bradford, Out of 
Medicine. Time, September 2002, at A13-14. In fact, a recent survey revealed that 42% of 
obstetricans are planning to move their practices out of southern Nevada in the face of 
skyrocketing insurance premiums for that area. Freedman, The Tort Mess. Forbes, May 
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The federal due process clause also does not provide Appellants refuge in 
this case. As the Alaska Supreme Court noted in Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska Inc., 
"the federal due process guarantee does not 'prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable 
and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing of a suit of a specified kind or class 
so long as the basis of distinction is real and the condition imposed has reasonable 
relation to a legitimate object'59 750 P.2d 343, 352 n.13 (Alaska 1988) (quoting Jones v. 
Union Guano Co.. 264 U.S. 171, 181, 44 S. Ct. 280, 282, 68 L.Ed. 623, 628 (1924) 
(upholding state statute providing that no suit for damages to crops resulting from 
fertilizer use may be brought except after chemical analysis showing deficiency of 
ingredients); and citing Prendergast 256 N.W.2d at 668 (legislature may pass law which 
seeks to distinguish between different types of tort actions so long as distinctions are 
reasonable and ground upon real differences inherent those actions)). The Utah legislature 
was certainly within its authority to counter what it deemed a substantial threat to public 
health and welfare and acted reasonably in doing so. 
Finally, Appellants attempt to distinguish the notice provisions and 
prerequisites of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. § 63-30-11, arguing that 
13, 2002, at 92. 
Other recent developments are troubling. In December of last year, St. Paul 
Companies, the nation's second-largest medical malpractice insurer, announced that it 
would no longer provide coverage for physicians after it lost $985 million in malpractice 
coverage in 2001. See Id As a result, "42,000 doctors and 750 hospitals, covering at least 
25% of the market in 12 states, will be left to seek new coverage, paying as much as 
300% more in premiums." IdL 
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the Immunity Act "creates a right of action when certain requirements are met" and that 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act "serves as a limitation on actions." Appellant's 
Brief, at 16-17. Appellants, however, are mistaken in their assertion that the Immunity 
Act "creates a right of action," when, in fact, the Immunity Act creates immunity from 
suit for any injury and then waives that immunity for specific obligations or injuries. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3; §§ 63-30-5 to 63-30-10.5. 
As part of the government's waiver of immunity for certain injuries, the 
Immunity Act requires individuals with claims against a governmental agency or 
employee to "file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action" 
within one year after the claim arises. IdL § 63-30-11(2), § 63-30-12. Failure to file a 
written notice within one year will bar any subsequent action to recover damages. See, 
e.g.. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake Citv. 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 (1934). Such a 
"limitation" on a litigant's right to initiate an action against the government has been held 
as a constitutional exercise of the legislature's authority. See Sears v. Southworth. 563 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977) (holding notice of claim requirement does not deny equal 
protection); cf Parks v. Utah Transit Auth.. 2002 UT 35,1fi[l5-l8, P3d 
(holding Governmental Immunity Act's limitation on recoverable damages did not violate 
provision of State Constitution prohibiting statutory limitations on amount recoverable in 
wrongful death action or provisions related to due process, uniform operation of laws, and 
the right to jury trial); Lvon v. Burton. 2000 UT 55, fflf 32-43, 5 P.3d 616 (statutory cap 
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on damages awards against government agencies did not violate open courts provisiu 
Utah Constitution by limiting recovery in in:lion in '"which governmental entity w as 
substituted for government employee) (Howe, J. concurring, with one justice concurring 
and one justice concurring in the result). 
Appellants certainly cannot argue that a "limitation" on medical malpractice 
actions under flu; 11 tali Health f * • constitutional --. 'violation i I 
due process. This Court has already upheld the statute of limitations found in the Act as a 
constitutional exercise of the legislature's power to limit the time in which malpractice 
claimants may initiate a lawsuit. See Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P 2d 
30. "12 (I llali l^ 'KIII I 1 likewise the IIOIKT mid p relitigation panel re\ ie;vi provisions of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act impose "limitations" on a claimant's ability to proceed 
with litigation—nevertheless, they do not restrict or preclude a claimant's ability to 
proceed once those notice and prelitigation requirements are met. This Court 
acknowledged when it upheld the A ct's shortened statute of limitations ""along 
with requiring notice of intention to sue" as a constitutional legislative acts to "insure the 
continued availability of adequate health care services." Id (emphasis added). 
The Act does not ''eliminate lawsuits against providers of medical care,' " as 
Appellants propose; rather, it is a constitutional enactment that serves to further the 
legislature's legitimate purpose of reigning in the spiraling costs of medical malpractice 
insurance, ensuring the continued availability of medical care, and encouraging the early 
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settlement of malpractice claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. Appellants were not cut 
off from their right of access to the courts or due process as long as they complied with 
the mandates of the Act. The trial court was correct to disregard Appellants' due process 
challenge (if, indeed, there was one), and this Court should do the same. 
2. The trial court's ruling did not deny Appellants access to the courts. 
Appellants next contend that the prelitigation panel review procedures 
mandated by the Act violates their right to access to the courts under Article I, section 11 
of the Utah Constitution. A challenge to a legislative enactment based upon the open 
courts clause of the Utah Constitution usually presumes that the legislature has acted to 
extinguish or abolish an existing right without providing a "substitute equivalent 
remedy." For example, in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985), 
the principal case upon which Appellants rely, this Court concluded that the statute of 
repose under the then-existing Utah Products Liability Act operated to arbitrarily 
extinguish a common-law or state tort law remedy without providing an adequate 
substitute remedy. See id. at 783. 
That is simply not what the legislature has done in this case. The Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act does not extinguish the common law right of a claimant to 
seek redress in court for injuries arising from alleged medical negligence. Rather, the Act 
serves to provide an informal forum and proceedings, which directly advance the 
legislature's stated purpose 
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to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
commenced against health care providers while limiting 1 
time to a specific period for which professional liability 
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to 
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
U.C.A. 78-14-2. 
Biisctl upon this legislative purpose tins I ouii has clecliiinl hclon Ihal Hit1 
Act was premised upon the need to protect and insure the continued availability of health 
care services to the public, and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to shield insurance companies 
from legitimate claims." Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 
MM I) Although the prelitigatioii protedmes ate informal, llic- /"Wt declares iliiil (Iit:\ '.in. 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
12(l)(c). It is the claimant's failure to comply with the Act's procedures, not the Act 
itself, that will prove fatal to initiating a medical negligence lawsuit. See, e.g., Avila v. 
Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 2,2 (I Jtah 1990); Allen 635 P ; see also Carter v. Milford 
Valley Mem'l Hosp., 2000 UT App 21,1fl3, 996 P.2d 1076 ("If these requirements are 
not fully met, the action will be dismissed.") (citing Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 134 
(Utah 1992)). 
Because flit" Ad docs mil oprnifr to rxliiii'.msh of iinniil ii stuti (oil mr 
common-law right, the analysis under Berry does not apply to this case. Indeed, the Berry 
"two-part test applies only when a right has been 'abrogated'" or extinguished. Burgandv 
v. State Dept. of Human Servs.. 1999 UT App 208,^16, 983 P.2d 586. Instead, this 
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Court's analysis in Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992), is more 
applicable to Appellants' arguments that essentially imply that their right to access to the 
court has been "chilled." 
In Jensen, ua statute required the taxpayers to deposit the full amount of 
assessed taxes, penalties, and interest (more than $340,000) with the Tax Commission 
before seeking appellate review." Burgandv. 1999 Utah App 208, at % 17, (citing Jensen, 
835 P.2d at 969). The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the statute did not actually 
extinguish an existing common law right and that the Berry analysis did not apply. 
Nevertheless, the court still found persuasive the appellant's argument that the statute had 
"chilled" his right to access to the courts. Id In holding that the statute was an 
unconstitutional bar to judicial review, the Jensen Court reasoned that "to the extent that 
[a statute] precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the open courts 
provision and is unconstitutional as applied." LI (quoting Jensen. 835 P.2d at 969) 
(emphasis added). 
Unlike the statute in Jensen, however, the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act still allows reasonable access to judicial review. True, medical malpractice claimants 
must comply with various prerequisites to filing a claim, such as serving notice of their 
intent to commence an action against a health care provider and submitting their claims to 
prelitigation panel review with the Division. The Act, however, appropriately balances 
the need to protect the public interest in available health care with the rights of 
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individuals to seek ivdiess loi claims in i oml I'lic pun r<lun"> ,iic "mlormul and 
nonbinding," and the Division is allowed to review the matter, claimants are free to 
pursue their claims through litigation. 
Based upon this Court's reasoning in Jensen and its progeny, limitations (if 
any) on Appellants' right to access to the courts in this case may be upheld so long as 
Appellants have reasonable access l<> I In courts or a rational basis exists for the Act.7 As 
explained above, the Utah legislature enacted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in 
response to a growing crisis in increased medical malpractice insurance. Most 
jurisdictions have cited this reason as the basis for upholding their panel review statutes, 
see,.y^, Liudei v. l.W. Smith. < 1190 (Mt. 1981), and have either 
expressly or impliedly concluded that a rational basis exists for any alleged delays and/or 
expenses. See, e.g.. Keyes. 750 P.2d at 358-59 (citing Seoane v. Ortho Pharm.. 660 F.2d 
N(,, I S| pth< ,i {l ,i ), |4KIK Woods, W| I' .Mai II ' I .i I b: Everett v. Goldman. -
So M P56 I;•<>«> 11 a lt>7S| I'UIO W> N V >d at 990: Under. 629 P.2dat 1191; 
Comiskevv.Arlen. 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (1976)). 
7
 Several other jurisdictions have considered whether similar prelitigation panel 
review procedures deny a claimant his or her right to access to the courts under their own 
constitutions. A majority of those courts have upheld those procedures against this 
challenge. See Irish v. Gimbel. 691 A.2d 664, 673 (Me. 1997) (citing Houk v. Furman. 
613 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (D. Me. 1985)); see also Under. 629 P.2d at 1190 (citing Parov. 
Longwood Hosp.. 369 N.E.2d 985, 989-990 (Mass. 1977); State ex rel. Strvkowski v. 
Wilkie. 261 N.W.2d 434, 444 (Wis. 1978); Prendereast v. Nelson. N.W.2d 657, 663-64 
(Neb. 1977); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp.. 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 n.16 (5th Cir. (Fla.), 
1979)). 
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As stated above, Appellants have not adequately preserved their 
constitutional argument for appeal, and they are therefore precluded from raising them for 
the first time on appeal. See Point II, infra. Nevertheless, even if these issues are 
adequately preserved, Appellants still have not presented this Court with any basis to rule 
that the Act prevents reasonable access to judicial review. The Act merely creates 
compulsory conditions precedent to commencing an action against a health care provider 
in Utah. Further, Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Act is without any 
rational basis. To the contrary, the increasing costs of medical malpractice insurance, the 
threat of diminished health care access for the public, and the encouragement of early 
evaluation of claims are all rational bases for the Utah legislature's action in this matter. 
Appellants were not deprived of their right to access to the courts. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER APPELLANTS' 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE UTAH HEALTH CARE 
MALPRACTICE ACT RASED UPON THE DIVISION'S ACTIONS BECAUSE 
THEY ARE NOT RELEVANT ON APPEAL. 
Appellants make a final attempt to excuse their noncompliance with the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act by claiming that the Division acted unconstitutionally 
by failing to (1) notify Appellants of their duty to file a Request for Prelitigation Panel 
Review with the Division; (2) notify Appellants of an alleged "lost" filing; or (3) 
promulgate adequate administrative rules for claimants who overlook prelitigation 
requirements or for "lost" filings. 
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These constitutional arguments all rely on Appellants' contention that their 
Request for Prelitigation Panel Review was filed with the Division—a fact that the trial 
court found was disputed. See Order of Dismissal, at 2, %L (R.246). The trial court, 
however, granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the undisputed fact that 
Appellants never served any of the named health care providers with a copy of their 
Request, pursuant to the mandate of Section 78-14-12(2)(b). See id.. \5. 
None of the constitutional challenges Appellants advance in their appeal to 
this Court addresses the trial court's ruling on this issue or this particular section of the 
Act. Appellants' arguments may have been appropriate had the trial court based its 
decision upon some deficiency with Appellants' filing of the Request or upon an action of 
the Division. Summary judgment, however, was based upon the undisputed fact that 
Appellants did not follow the plain language of Section 78-14-12(2)(b) by serving a copy 
of the Request upon all named health-care providers in the action. Service of the Request 
was wholly the responsibility of the Appellants, and the Division had nothing to do with 
this requirement. As such, the trial court correctly concluded that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the matter and properly dismissed the Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellees Ivan D. Wright, M.D., Harold Vonk, 
M.D., and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D., respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
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decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and against 
Appellants Helen LaBelle, Sheila Carlson, Linda Buckley, and Marilyn Phillips. 
DATED this i % dav of September, 2002. 
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78-14-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
mother during pregnancy, labor, and child 
birth, 3 A.L.R.5th 123. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
or child caused by inadequate attendance or 
monitoring of patient during and after preg-
nancy, labor, and delivery, 3 A.L.R.5th 146. 
Liability of doctor or other health practitio-
ner to third party contracting contagious dis-
ease from doctor's patient, 3 A.L.R.5th 370. 
Refusal of medical treatment on religious 
grounds as affecting right to recover for per-
sonal injury or death, 3 AL.R.5th 721. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
or child caused by improper choice between, or 
timing of, vaginal or cesarean delivery, 4 
A.L.R.5th 148. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
or child caused by improper procedures during 
vaginal delivery, 4 A.L.R.5th 210. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
or child caused by improper treatment during 
labor, 6 A.L.R.5th 490. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
caused by improper postdelivery diagnosis, 
care, and representations, 6 A.L.R.5th 534. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
or child caused by improper diagnosis and 
treatment of mother relating to and during 
pregnancy, 7 A.L.R.5th 1. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
state statutory provisions limiting amount of 
recovery in medical malpractice claims, 26 
A.L.R.5th 245. 
Ophthalmological malpractice, 30 AL.R.5th 
571. 
Medical malpractice in connection with 
breast augmentation, reduction, or reconstruc-
tion, 28 A.L.R.5th 497. 
Medical malpractice: negligent catheteriza-
tion, 31 AL.R.5th 1. 
Medical malpractice liability or sports medi-
cine care providers for injury to, or death of, 
athlete, 33 AL.R.5th 619. 
Malpractice in treatment of skin disease, 
disorder, blemish, or scar, 19 AL.R.5th 563. 
When does medical practitioner's treatment 
of patient constitute "willful and malicious in-
jury," so as to make practitioner's debt arising 
from such treatment nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(6) of Bankruptcy Act (11 USCS 
§ 523(a)(6)), 77 AL.R. Fed. 918. 
Free exercise of religion clause of First 
Amendment as defense to tort liability, 93 
AL.R. Fed. 754. 
73-14-2. Legislative findings and declaratic 
of act* 
is — Purpose 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health 
care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the 
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims is 
increased health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the 
cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive 
medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. 
Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to 
provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of 
malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care 
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a 
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes 
unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and 
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to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settle-
ment of claims. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 2. act" in the last paragraph means Laws 1976, 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this Chapter 23, which enacted this chapter. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Medi-
cal Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 287 (1984). 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under 
Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing 
Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
certified social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiro-
practic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a 
clinical social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided 
in Section 31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental 
hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in 
Section 58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, 
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physi-
cian, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, 
dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, 
physical therapist, podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physi-
cian, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician 
and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social 
worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family 
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and 
services relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups 
of persons and officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in 
the course and scope of their employment. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-14-7.1, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 205, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments mental anguish or emotional distress for tor-
m Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — tiously causing another's birth, 74 A L.R 4th 
Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev 292. 798 
AX.R. — Future disease or condition, or Medical malpractice measure and elements 
anxiety relating thereto, as element of recovery,
 0f damages in actions based on loss of chance, 
50 A L R 4th 13 81 A L R 4th 485 
Recoverability of compensatory damages for 
78-14-7.5* Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in 
malpract ice action. 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in 
Section 78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a contingent fee for representing 
a client seeking damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or 
wrongful death caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 33V3% of the 
amount recovered. 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settle-
ment, arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal is involved. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-7.5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 67, § 1. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless 
and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances 
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the 
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice 
is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be 
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, 
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This 
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. 
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Action not timely filed. 
Effect of improper notice. 
Extension of time. 
Imputed knowledge. 
Notice. 
Retroactive effect of 1979 amendment. 
Tolling statute of limitations. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The 1979 amendment of this section did not 
violate constitutional requirement that acts 
embrace no more than one subject; since title of 
a bill need not describe each and every change 
contained in the bill and the title of an act 
amending a previous act is sufficient if it simply 
specifies the section to be amended. McGuire v. 
University of Utah Medical Ctr., 603 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1979). 
The 1979 amendment of this section is not 
unconstitutional as being a special law; the 
amendment clearly operates uniformly upon a 
class of persons consisting of ail those having a 
cause of action arising prior to the effective date 
of the Health Care Malpractice Act (April 1, 
1976) whether they have been filed or not. 
McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Ctr., 
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979). 
This section does not constitute unconstitu-
tional special legislation. Yates v. Vernal Fam-
ily Health Ctr , 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). 
This section does not violate Utah Const., 
Art. I, Sec. 24 or Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26. 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981). 
Action not t imely filed. 
Where plaintiff experienced complications 
from breast surgery necessitating a second op-
eration on November 2, 1976, and then filed a 
notice of intent under this section on August 17, 
1978, but did not file the action until January 
18, 1979, the action was properly dismissed 
since the action had to be filed within 120 days 
of the filing of the notice of intent (December 
15,1978). Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 
934 (Utah 1980). 
Effect of i m p r o p e r not ice . 
The notice provisions of this section were not 
complied with where plaintiff's husband, 
rather than plaintiff herself, filed the notice; 
however, such failure to comply was not an 
adjudication on the merits, but merely a proce-
dural defect that did not relate to the merits of 
Cross-References . — Service of summons 
and complaint, U.R.C.P. 4. 
the basic action, and plaintiff was entitled to 
serve a proper notice and file another complaint 
pursuant to the requirements of § 78-12-40. 
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 
352 (Utah 1980). 
Extension of t ime. 
When a plaintiff serves a notice of intent to 
commence action within 90 days of the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations, thereby be-
coming entitled to an additional 120-day exten-
sion, a court may not bar the plaintiff's action 
for failure to file a request for prelitigation 
review within 60 days of that notice. Gramlich 
v. Munsey, 838 P.2d* 1131 (Utah 1992). 
Imputed knowledge . 
Where plaintiff's former attorney had hired a 
physician to evaluate her claim of malpractice 
and the attorney had filed a notice of intent to 
commence action, any knowledge reflected by 
the attorney's filing of the notice was imputed 
to plaintiff in determining her knowledge for 
purposes of the running of the statute of limi-
tations. Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P.2d 401 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Notice. 
Filing of the complaint did not satisfy the 
notice requirement as this section required 
notice be given ninetv davs before filing. Vealev 
v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
Retroactive effect of 1979 amendment . 
The 1979 amendment of this section was 
retroactive; however, the notice of intent to sue 
provision is not applicable to causes of action 
arising before enactment of the Malpractice Act 
(April 1, 1976.) and does not determine when an 
action is "commenced." Foil v. Ballmger. 601 
P2d 144 (Utah 1979); McGuire v. University of 
Utah Medical Ctr., 603 P2d 786 (Utah 1979). 
Tolling statute of l imi t a t ions . 
The 90-day period following the giving of 
notice under this section is not a statutory 
prohibition under § 78-12-41 so as to toll the 
statute of limitations during the 90-day period 
since the specific provision of this section con-
trols the general provision of § 78-12-41. 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1980i. 
A notice of intent, served less than 90 days 
before the expiration of the two-year staiute of 
limitations but not less than 90 days before the 
expiration of the four-year statutory period, 
extends both periods of time for 120 davs 
Forbes v. St. Marks Hosp.. 754 P.2d 933 -Utah 
1988). 
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Cited in Duerden v. Utah Valley Hosp., 663 768 P.2d 449 (Utah 1989); Malone v. Parker, 
F. Supp. 781 (D. Utah 1987); Phillips v. Smith, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Key Numbers. — Physicians and Surgeons 
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 315. <£= 18(2). 
C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons 
§ 109. 
78-14-9* Professional liability insurance coverage for 
providers — Insurance commissioner may re-
quire joint underwriting authority. 
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of this state any 
professional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not 
readily available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest 
requires, he may by regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide 
insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability policies 
and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing medical, 
surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense 
incurred basis, including personal injury protection and medical expense 
coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 9. ties may purchase liability insurance, § 63-30-
Cross-References. — Governmental enti- 28 et seq. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance practice under state law, 49 A.L.R.4th 1240. 
§ 17 et seq. State regulation of insurer's right to classify 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. insureds for premium or other underwriting 
A.L.R. - Health provider's agreement as to purposes by occupation, 57 A.L.R.4th 625. 
patient's copayment liability after award by Key Numbers. - Insurance ®=> 11.1. 
professional service insurer as unfair trade 
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in mal-
practice actions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's damages for future 
medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily 
function, or future pain and suffering. 
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of 
other property to the judgment creditor at such intervals as ordered by the 
court. 
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, as defined in 
Section 78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of any party, order that future 
damages which equal or exceed $100,000, less amounts payable for attorney's 
fees and other costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by 
periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment. 
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of future damages by 
periodic payments, the court shall order periodic payments to provide a fair 
correlation between the sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost 
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78-14-9*5* Periodic payment of future damages In ma!« 
pract ice actions* 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, The Fraught Rejection of the Current Tort System. 
Utah Medical No-Fault Proposal: A Problem- 1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — Pro-
cedures — Sta tu te of l imitations tolled — Com-
position of panel — Expenses — Division autho-
rized to set license fees* 
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical liability 
cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except 
dentists. 
(b.) (i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation consid-
eration of medical liability claims for damages arising out of the 
provision of or alleged failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the 
process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and the 
conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 78-14-12 
through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory 
as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confiden-
tial, privileged, and immune from civil process. 
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the 
sendee of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 
78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence 
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in 
the notice and request. 
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 
days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation 
panel, or 60 days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division 
as provided in this subsection. The division shall send any opinion issued 
by the panel to all parties by regular mail. 
(b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this 
section within 180 days after the filing of the request for prelitigation 
panel review, or within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by 
all parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the 
time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i). the division has no 
further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant 
is considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required 
under this section prior to the commencement of litigation. 
(c'» (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipula-
tion that no useful purpose would be served by convening a 
prelitigation panel under this section. 
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di) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall 
within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of 
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, 
and stating that the claimant has complied with all conditions 
precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim. 
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels 
to hear complaints of medical liability and damages, made by or on behalf of 
any patient who is an alleged victim of medical liability. The panels are 
composed of: 
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good 
standing to practice law in this state and who shall serve as chairman of 
the panel, who is appointed by the division from among qualified individu-
als wTho have registered writh the division indicating a willingness to serve 
as panel members, and a willingness to comply with the rules of profes-
sional conduct governing lawyers in the state of Utah, and who has 
completed division training regarding conduct of panel hearings; 
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under 
Section 78-14-3, who is practicing and knowledgeable in the same 
specialty as the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the 
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member 
who is an individual currently serving in a hospital administration 
position directly related to hospital operations or conduct that in-
cludes responsibility for the area of practice that is the subject of the 
liability claim, and who is appointed by the division; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other 
health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected 
and appointed by the division from among individuals who have completed 
division training writh respect to panel hearings. 
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78-14-3 and 
practicing under a license issued by the state, is obligated as a condition 
of holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability 
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issu-
ance, with advance notice given in a reasonable time frame, by the division 
of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel 
Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a 
panel member upon the division finding participation by the licensee will 
create an unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee. 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate 
as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or 
justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be 
assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed 
to appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without 
adequate explanation or justification and without being excused for cause 
by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed 
$5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) shall be deposited 
in the Physicians Education Fund created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he 
has no bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consider-
ation. 
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(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem 
compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established 
by rules of the division. 
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health 
care providers, the division may set license fees of health care providers 
within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of 
administering prelitigation panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the 
prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-12, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 1; 1986, ch. 170, § 2; 1987, 
ch. 92, § 159; 1989, ch. 26, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, 
§ 95; 1994, ch. 171, § 2; 1996, ch. 248, § 56; 
1997, ch. 137, § 1; 2002, ch. 256, § 69. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "ser-
vice" for "filing" in Subsection (2)(a) and rewrote 
Subsection (3). 
The 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, 
substituted "Fund" for "Account'' in Subsection 
(5)<e). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Confidentiality. 
Prerequisite to filing complaint. 
—Prelitigation panel review. 
Cited. 
Confidentiality. 
Because the notice of intent serves as the 
basis for a prelitigation panel review, and is 
often utilized as part of the prelitigation review, 
it is part of the proceeding, and thus must be 
kept confidential. Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74. 
984 P.2d 980. 
Prerequis i te to filing complaint. 
— Prel i t igat ion panel review. 
Under § 78-14-8, plaintiffs time for filing a 
malpractice action was extended an additional 
120 days from the date of the service of his first 
notice of intent; however, he was not entitled to 
any further extension because he failed to com-
ply with the requirement in this section that 
the party initiating an action shall file a re-
quest for prelitigation panel review with the 
Division within sixty days after the filing of the 
notice of intent. Kittredge v. Shaddv, 2001 UT 
7, 20 R3d 285. 
Cited in Carter v. Milford Valley Mem'l 
Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, 996 P.2d 1076. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Contract 
Law. 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
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Panel: Exploring State Constitutional Argu-
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cedure, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 359. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, The 
Utah Medical No-Fault Proposal: A Problem-
Fraught Rejection of the Current Tort Svstem, 
1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authori ty of panel — Eights of 
par t ies to proceedings. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Discovery, m medical malpractice 
action, of names and medical records of other 
patients to whom defendant has given treat-
ment similar to that allegedly injuring plaintiff. 
66 A L.Roth 591 
